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Abstract
We apply an extension of the Rothbarth approach to estimate the share of
household resources accruing to children (i.e., the cost of children) in Ireland.
The method also allows us to identify the economies of scale in the household
and indi⁄erence scales in Lewbel (2003)￿ s sense. A practical aspect of the
present approach is that it does not require price variation. The identi￿cation
of the children￿ s share requires the observation of adult-speci￿c goods as in
the traditional Rothbarth method. We compare our ￿ndings to previous
results for Ireland.
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11 Introduction
The economic measurement of the cost of children has received a lot of attention in
the literature.1 While it is intimately related to the literature on equivalence scales,
it also has its own important policy implications. One example is the possibility to
determine child support payments by a noncustodial parent to a custodial parent
in the event of divorce. Another ￿eld of application is the direct measure of child
poverty.2 It is crucial in Ireland where, like in other English speaking countries,
rates of child poverty tend to be particularly high (see Micklewright, 2004, Callan
et al., 2007).3
Several empirical approaches have been suggested to infer the cost of children from
expenditure surveys. In particular, the traditional Rothbarth (1943) method is
based on the intuition that goods exclusively consumed by adults yield some in-
formation on what children receive from their parents. This approach has been
formalized by several authors, including Gronau (1991) and Lazear and Michael
(1988), and extended by Bargain and Donni (2009) to account for economies of
scale in the household. The latter approach is closely related to the most recent
developments of the literature on collective models.4 Precisely, recent papers sug-
gest a complete identi￿cation of scale economies and the household sharing rule
based on the estimation of individual demand functions (Browning et al., 2006)
or individual Engel curves (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008) on data for single in-
dividuals.5 The identi￿cation crucially relies on the assumption that household
demands di⁄er from those of single individuals only because of (some) jointness
of consumption and sharing within the household. While these authors focus on
scale economies and resource sharing within childless couples, Bargain and Donni
(2009) extend the approach to families with children and retrieve the sharing rule
between wife, husband and children.6 Browning et al. (2006) account for economies
1See Browning (1992) and Lewbel (1997) for a survey.
2Financial resources channeled to children are not only of importance for their present well-
being but may also have pervasive e⁄ect over the lifetime.
3According to Layte et al. (2006), 26% of children under 14 years of age are at risk of poverty,
i.e., in households with income below 60% of median equivalised income, against an average of
20% for the EU-25. According to CSO (2006), one in ten children is in consistent poverty (i.e.,
in a low income household and deprived of basic necessities).
4See Donni (2008) and Chiappori and Donni (2010) for a survey.
5The early paper of Conni⁄e (1992) already went in the direction of Browning et al. (2006)
and can be considered a precursor to this literature.
6Research on collective models has so far ignored the role of children. The sole exceptions, to
our knowledge, are Blundell et al. (2005), Bourguignon (1999) and Menon and Perali (2007).
2of scale using a (price) transformation ￿ la Barten (1964); alternatively, Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008) and Bargain and Donni (2009) make an independence of base as-
sumption that allows them to achieve identi￿cation without price variation. This
is of particular relevance for countries in which spatial or time variation in prices
is limited.
The present paper applies the approach of Bargain and Donni (2009) to Irish data,
and focuses on three types of households: single individuals (either male or female),
childless couples and couples with one child. We consider only families with young
children, for whom the assumption that children do not have any decision-making
power is reasonable. Therefore, the resource share accruing to children in this
setting can be equally interpreted as the cost of children for (benevolent) parents.
The identi￿cation of children￿ s share relies on the observation of adult clothing
while that of adult shares and scale economies is based on estimations of individual
Engel curves on single individuals. We compare our ￿ndings to previous studies
for Ireland, in particular those applying the traditional Rothbarth method.
In Section 2, we brie￿ y summarize the model of Bargain and Donni (2009). Section
3 describes the empirical implementation and data selection. Section 4 reports the
results and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider three household types n, namely a single individual (n = 1), a couple
without children (n = 2) and a couple with one child (n = 3). Superscript k =
1;:::;K denotes goods while individuals are indexed by subscript j. By convention,
we suppose that j = 1 is a male adult, j = 2 is a female adult and j = 3 is a child.
The log total expenditure in a household is denoted by x and the vector of log prices
by p. We assume that total expenditure exp(x) is divided between household
members according to some rule. Precisely, individual j living in household n
receives a resource share ￿j;n(p;x) of total expenditure exp(x). These shares may,
in general, depend on prices and total expenditure.7 The shares of all members
are positive and sum up to unity, i.e.,
Pn
j=1 ￿j;n(p;x) = 1. The "basic" budget
share of individual j for good k is denoted wk
j; that is, if person j is living alone,
he/she spends the fraction wk
j of total expenditure exp(x) on good k. If he/she
is living with other persons (parents, children or spouse), his/her "basic" budget
7For instance, we can imagine that the resources accruing to the child vary when the price of
child goods changes (see also Bargain and Donni, 2008, on this point).
3share functions change in a way that re￿ ects scale economies and resource sharing,
as described in detail in what follows. The share spent by household n on good k
is denoted by W k
n.8
Multi-person households (n > 1) are characterized by economies of scale due to
the sharing and jointness of consumption in the household. Following Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008) and Bargain and Donni (2009), we exploit the Independence of
Base (IB) assumption, that we introduce formally below, to represent these scale
economies. Denote Vj(p;￿) the indirect utility of individual j endowed with log
resources ￿, that is, ￿ corresponds to total expenditure x in a single household
(n = 1) and to a scaled version of the share of total expenditure x + log￿j;n in
a multi-person household (n > 1). More precisely, for each person j living in a
household of type n > 1, we assume that there exists a scalar-valued function
sj;n(p) such that the indi⁄erence curves of individual j satisfy the condition:
Uj = Vj(p;x + log￿j;n(p;x) ￿ logsj;n(p)) (1)
for any level of log individual expenditure x + log￿j;n(p;x). Clearly, ￿j;1(p;x) =
sj;1(p) = 1 for a single individual (n = 1). Intuitively, equation (1) supposes that
economies of scale can be summarized by a simple income e⁄ect represented by
the de￿ ator sj;n(p). The latter measures the cost savings experienced by person j
resulting from scale economies in the household. The IB assumption refers to the
fact that scale economies are assumed to be independent of the base expenditure
(and hence utility) level at which they are evaluated. This assumption is similar
to the IB restriction in the equivalence scale literature, and can be justi￿ed in
the same way, but it concerns individual utility functions rather than aggregated
household utility functions.
Denote logIj;n = logsj;n(p) ￿ log￿j;n(p;x) so that for n > 1, equation (1) can be
written as:
Uj = Vj(p;x ￿ logIj;n(p;x)): (2)
The term Ij;n is an indi⁄erence scale as de￿ned by Lewbel (2003) and Browning
et al. (2006). Indi⁄erence scales di⁄er from ordinary household equivalence scales,
which attempt to compare the utility of an individual to the utility of a household
and hence su⁄er from the identi￿cation problems associated with interpersonal
comparisons (Pollak and Wales, 1992). In contrast, an indi⁄erence scale compares
8Similar notations are used hereafter to represent budget share functions, whose arguments
are speci￿ed as we go along.
4the same individual in two di⁄erent situations: living alone and living in a house-
hold. It represents the income adjustment applied to person j when living alone
for her/him to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as when living in a multi-person
household (and consuming a share ￿j;n of total resources while bene￿ting from scale
economies as represented by sj;n).
Applying Roy￿ s identity to equation (1), it is easy to show that individual j￿ s budget














is the elasticity of sj;n with respect to the k-th price. The consequence of the IB
assumption in the present context is that the budget share functions of person j
when living in a household di⁄er from when alone only in that they are translated
over log household resources x by logIj;n and over each wk
j by dk
j;n.
We now suppose that data are observed in a unique price regime: the vector of
prices p is constant and can be taken out of equation (3). This simpli￿cation is
allowed by the IB assumption and is well adapted for countries where price variation
is small.9 Although the scale economies do not depend on the base expenditure,
they may nonetheless vary with the demographic structure of the household. Thus,
a vector z of household socio-demographic variables is introduced in equation (3).
We can now introduce formally the IB assumption in a framework with no price
variation:
A.1. The individual preferences and the household technology satisfy the IB as-








j (x ￿ logIj;n(x;z);zj); (4)
where logIj;n(x;z) = logsj;n(zj) ￿ log￿j;n(x;z) is the log de￿ator of total expendi-
ture which combines the scaling e⁄ect sj;n and resource sharing ￿j;n.
9This is the case for our application on Irish data, since there is little spatial variation in
prices, contrary to large countries like Canada or the US, and little time variation (only three
cross-sections are available over the past twenty years: 1995, 1999 and 2005).
5The left-hand side of equation (4) represents the ￿ reduced-form￿budget share of
person j on good k as a function of (log) household resources x and household
characteristics z. The right-hand side puts some structure on the budget share as
a result of the IB restriction. The individual budget share function wk
j depends on
person j￿ s individual resources adjusted by the scaling factor sj;n and on individual-
speci￿c characteristics zj. This share is also translated by the price elasticity
of scale economies. The scaling e⁄ect sj;n, and subsequently its price elasticity
dk
j;n, depend on individual characteristics zj. The resource share ￿j;n depends on
household total expenditure and on the vector of household characteristics z, which
nests the individual characteristics zj of all members j and may also incorporate
variables that govern the resource sharing rule in the household (i.e., distribution
factors, see Browning et al., 2006). One important candidate for these variables
is the ratio of spouses￿exogenous incomes in as much as the household bargaining
power of spouses depends on what they earn.
One word of reservation is needed here. Changes in the demographic structure
of the household may also generate modi￿cation of preferences and externalities
in consumption that are not explicitly accounted for by the IB assumption. Note
that the model of Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) exhibits basically the same prob-
lem even if it is perhaps more critical as soon as children are incorporated in the
analysis. In particular, the apparition of a child in the household may generate
important externalities. For example, the parents may decide stop smoking and to
change their leisure activities. Whether the de￿ ator sj;n(z) can conveniently repre-
sent modi￿cations of preferences and externalities in consumption is a complicated
question which is beyond the scope of the present paper. If the answer is negative,
however, the interpretation of the empirical results we make may be biased. We
have to keep in mind these potential limitations of the model.
For each good k, we can write total household expenditure as the sum of individual
expenditure on that good. Dividing this identity by total outlay exp(x), we obtain









This is simply the sum of individual budget share functions of all household mem-













j (x ￿ logIj;n(x;z);zj)
￿
; (6)
6where individual budget shares are translated both in budget shares and log-
expenditure. As previously described, the translations are meaningful model pa-
rameters: translations in log-expenditure are individual indi⁄erence scales while
translation in budget shares are scales economy price elasticities.
The complete identi￿cation results are presented in Bargain and Donni (2009).
Hereafter, we simply provide the main intuition of the proofs in a slightly simpli￿ed
context. Firstly, it is important to notice that the central element in (4) and (6)
is the "basic" budget share function wk
j(￿;zj), that is, the share of good k chosen
by an individual j endowed with characteristics zj. This function is identical for
single individuals or adults in multi-person households. For an adult living in a
couple (n = 2), his/her "basic" budget share function is simply a⁄ected by resource
sharing and scale economies in the household. That is to say, di⁄erences between
an individual￿ s bundle of goods consumed as a single versus within a household are
assumed to be due to partially joint consumption, resource sharing and to changes
in total resources. As argued by Gronau (1988), this assumption, as strong as it
may seem, is necessary to make the comparison of individuals living in di⁄erent
households possible. Hence, the "basic" share function is directly retrieved using
estimates from single individuals, for whom W k
1 (x;z) = wk
j (x;zj).
To identify the household technology and the shares of income, the following addi-
tional assumption will be used:
A.2. The resource sharing functions are independent of total household expendi-
ture, that is, ￿j;n(x;z) = ￿j;n(z) for j = 1;2;3 and n = 2;3.
From the knowledge of the "basic" share functions, it is then possible to identify
household technology sj;2 and the shares of income ￿j;2 (for j = 1;2), as demon-
strated in Bargain and Donni (2009) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). The idea
is simple. Suppose ￿rst that wk
j (￿;zj) are known functions. Then, when z is main-
tained constant, there exist (generically) unique values for sj;2 and ￿j;2 such that
equation (6) with n = 2 is satis￿ed for any value of x within its domain. Note that
assumption A.2 is potentially a strong restriction but it is not absolutely essen-
tial (it could be abandonned at expense of some complications ￿see Bargain and
Donni, 2009). Moreover, it can be mitigated by including measures of household
wealth other than total expenditure in income shares, as we do in the last part of
the empirical section.
Finally, for a couple with a child (n = 3), the complete identi￿cation of resource
shares requires the following assumption:
7A.3. There exists at least one exclusive good for adults, that is, a good which is
consumed by parents but not by children.
This identi￿cation assumption is also made in Gronau (1991) and is at the basis
of the Rothbarth intuition. If assumption A.3 is satis￿ed, the parent￿ s shares of
income and economies of scale can be recovered from the observation of the budget
share functions of adult goods. Note that, for the child, certain parameters cannot
be identi￿ed. They can be normalized without loss of generality, precisely:
d
k
3;3(z3) = 0; s3;3(z3) = 1;
since children are not observed living alone. The child￿ s share of total resources is
then retrieved directly as ￿3;3(z) = 1 ￿ ￿1;3(z) ￿ ￿2;3(z):
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Form and Estimation Method
For the estimation, we suggest a parameterization that balances ￿ exibility and
empirical tractability. The ￿rst component, which appears in the speci￿cation of
the di⁄erent demographic groups, is the "basic" budget share function. For adults,

















for j = 1;2 and k = 1;:::K, with ￿ a given level of log individual expenditures




j and vectors of parameters ak
j and ej. The vectors of adult
characteristics z1 and z2 include age ("above 35" dummy), education ("tertiary
education" dummy), and dummies for car ownership and urban. The parameters
are gender speci￿c (i.e., are indexed j = 1 for men and j = 2 for women) but do
not depend on the demographic type n since the "basic" budget share functions
are the same for single women (men) and for women (men) living in a couple. For
children, the vector z3 includes a gender dummy in order to di⁄erentiate the cost of
boys and girls; it could also re￿ ect di⁄erences in children￿ s age ￿but in the current
application, we focus on the group of children aged 0-4 so that age variables have
not been included.
We now turn to the speci￿cation of the household budget share functions. For
single male and female adults, they coincide with the "basic" budget share functions
8speci￿ed above, that is,
W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k






















comprise the individual functions wk
j as already speci￿ed and three other compo-









j;n is a vector of parameters. The parameters of the ￿rst individual are set
to zero for normalization. Vector z includes the sets of individual characteristics
zj for j = 1;:::n and a distribution factor, the wage ratio. The latter is de￿ned
as the ratio of wife￿ s over husband￿ s earnings expressed in full-time equivalent (as
explained below, we restrict our sample to household where all adults are in work).10
Secondly, the log scale function that translates expenditure within the basic budget








j;n and ￿j;n are parameters. In principle, it can vary with all the variables
used in preferences (vector zj). Finally, the scale function that translates the
basic budget shares dk
j;n(zj) is a price elasticity. Price e⁄ects are typically di¢ cult
to measure, so it is all the more di¢ cult to conceive that their interaction with
demographics can be captured in any plausible way. Therefore we restrict these






Since budget shares sum up to one, equations for good K are unnecessary. The
household budget share functions for K ￿ 1 goods and for the three demographic
groups are estimated simultaneously. The complete model is estimated by the
10We could also include the di⁄erence in spouses￿education level (schooling years) or age. Since
education and age are already in the zj vector of adults, then vector z automatically accounts
for these di⁄erences ￿even if only through age and education dummies.
9iterated SURE method. The ￿rst variant of the model presented hereafter (model
A) imposes some exclusion restrictions on the demographic variables while model
B is the complete model; model C is similar to Gronau (1991), that is, corresponds
to a structural Rothbarth approach without scale economies. Finally, the last
model (variant D) accounts for the likely correlation between the error terms "k
n
in each budget share function and the log total expenditure by augmenting the
speci￿cation with the errors ^ ￿n;x and ^ ￿n;x2 obtained from reduced form estimations
of x and x2 respectively on all exogenous variables used in the model plus some
excluded instruments (see Blundell and Robin, 1999, 2000, Banks et al., 1997). For
the latter, we choose log household gross income and its square.
3.2 Data
Our sample is drawn from the 2005 Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS). This
data is gathered from the third quarter 2004 to the end of 2005, but only little
price variation is witnessed over this period so that the HBS sample can be treated
as cross-sectional data. We estimate the system of budget shares for K = 9 non-
durable commodities: food, "vice" goods (alcohol and tobacco), male and female
clothing, transport, leisure, personal goods and services, household operation and
a composite child good (child clothing and pocket money); the omitted good is
housing costs (rent, observed for tenant or predicted for owners of their dwelling).11
The initial survey is composed of 6;884 households. We select households where
adults are aged 25-64, which restricts the initial sample by 30%. We only keep
those comprising a childless single man or woman, childless married couples and
married couples with one child aged 0-4 (in all cases, we discard observations where
other household members, relatives or not, are present. This restricts the initial
sample by another 27%. Since leisure is not modeled here, but is likely endogenous
to consumption (and savings) decisions, we restrict our sample to working women
and full-time working men. This discards another 28% of the original sample. The
￿nal sample is composed of 1;023 observations and is described in Table 1.
11In the original data, a marginal proportion of single women reports nonzero expenditures on
male clothing. In order to treat clothing as an assignable good, these expenditures are set to
zero. The same is done for expenditures on female clothing by single men and expenditures on
children by childless households.
10Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Single Single Childless  Couples
women men couples & 1 child
Age (head) 45.2 43.8 42.4 38.0
(9.9) (10.7) (11.6) (7.9)
Years of education (head) 15.5 14.4 14.6 14.6
(3.5) (3.4) (3.6) (3.1)
Living in city 0.86 0.72 0.69 0.67
(0.34) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47)
Tenant 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.06
(0.35) (0.36) (0.32) (0.25)
Have a car 0.84 0.82 0.95 0.97
(0.37) (0.38) (0.21) (0.18)
Wage ratio (wf/wm) n.a. n.a. 0.90 0.93
(0.50) (0.52)
477 412 700 770
(235) (220) (305) (306)
Budget shares
Food 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.22
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Vices 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Men's clothing 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03)
Women's clothing 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.09) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04)
Child's clothing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Transport 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Leisure 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
Household operations 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Pers. goods & services 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.12
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10)
Housing 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Sample size 213 191 369 250
Total expenditure (EUR/week)
Standard  deviation  are  in  brackets.
114 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimations
Table 2 reports the estimated economies of scale sj;n(zj) for j = 1;2 and resource
shares ￿j;n(z) for j = 2;3 evaluated at the sample mean, as well as their standard
errors.12 Notice that de￿ ators sj;n should, in principle, lie between :5 (complete
jointness of consumption) and 1 (purely private consumption) in a couple if these
terms are to be interpreted as re￿ ecting scale economies. A de￿ ator of :75 for
(childless) couples means that the cost of living for a man (say) with a woman is
75% of the cost he would experience, should he live alone.
We ￿rst consider results for childless couples. Reassuringly, point estimates re-
ported in Table 2 are reasonable in magnitude, all located in the :5￿1 range with
only one exception (males in model D). Overall, we ￿nd that point estimates give
scale economies between :43 and :76 for men and between :53 and :66 for women.
These results correspond to slightly smaller de￿ ators, and hence slightly larger scale
economies, than those reported in Lewbel and Pendakur (2008).13 However, the
standard errors for the log de￿ ators are large in both studies, and neither study
can reject that de￿ ators lie in the :5 ￿ 1 range.
It is fair to say that parameters are imprecisely estimated and our results are
sensitive to the speci￿cation.14 We have experimented more speci￿cations than
those reported here, including di⁄erent instruments in model D. In particular, we
￿nd some sensitivity to the choice of instruments, in a similar way as in GMM
estimations. As reported in Table 2, we can see for instance that the much smaller
share for men in model D, compared to models A-C, is compensated by larger
scale economies. This type of substitution is more or less strong depending on the
instruments at use. Estimations are also less stable when the residuals of a ￿rst-
stage estimation are included, since they enter linearly in the household budget
share functions together with the di⁄erent constants of the model (preferences and
12Estimates for the hundreds of parameters of the model, comprising the coe¢ cients of the
basic budget share functions for each good and each variant of the model, are available upon
request to the authors.
13These authors report de￿ ators between :74 and :86 for men and :53 and :79 for women over
the di⁄erent models.
14Note that the standard errors reported in the Table are not so informative since economies
of scale are nonlinear (exponential) transformation of the original coe¢ cients.
12Table 2: Estimation Results
Model
men, no child 0.76 0.63 1.00 0.43
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13)
men, 1 child 0.69 0.63 1.00 0.53
(0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
women, no child 0.55 0.61 1.00 0.61
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
women, 1 child 0.48 0.56 1.00 0.53
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
wife's share (no child) 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.63
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
wife's share (with girl) 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.51
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
wife's share (with boy) 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.48
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
girl's share 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
boy's share 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.23
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08)
-0.066 -0.070 -0.099 -0.012
(0.047) (0.050) (0.063) (0.013)
Wage ratio on child's share 0.026 0.030 0.010 0.084 *
(0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.030)
Girl dummy on child's share 0.157 0.066 0.068 -0.279 *
(0.110) (0.090) (0.088) (0.127)
Objective function 8.8041 8.7870 8.8122 8.7094
Number of parameters 161 175 155 237
Model A: dummies for car holders and urbaners in preference translator only
Model B: these dummies included also in preference deflator, scale economies and sharing rule
Model C: same as B but no scale economies (Rothbarth model)
Model D: same as B but with endogeneity of log expenditure allowed for in a quadratic way
Notes: Goods are food, vices, male and female clothing, transport, leisure, pers. goods & serv., household
operation and child good (clothing and pocket money); the omitted good is housing; Demographics affecting
preferences (i.e. translate and deflate the log expenditure) and scale economies (deflator) are: male and
female age and education, a dummy for car ownership and one for urban/rural. Economies of scale and
sharing  rules  are  calculated  at  sample  means.  Standard  errors  in  brackets.
A B C
Economies of scale




Turning to estimates for couples with one young child, we ￿nd similar results, with
scale economies between :53 and :84 for men and :48 and :73 for women over all the
models that we have experimented. One would expect that scale economies increase
(i.e., that de￿ ators decrease) in families compared to childless couples. Our results
point in this direction for most of the speci￿cations reported in Table 2, with the
exception of males in models B and D. Yet, standard errors are even larger than
in the case of childless couples, probably due to the more di¢ cult identi￿cation of
the model with children.
The estimates of the resource shares ￿ are more precisely estimated. For childless
couples, the wife￿ s resource share ranges from :51 to :63 across models with a
standard error around :07.16 The e⁄ect of demographic variables on the sharing
rule was also investigated but the sign and signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients on age
and education vary when we introduce the correction for endogeneity in model
D. The only stable result is that higher male education plays in favor of a larger
resource share for men. The share of children ￿interpreted as the cost of children
￿is relatively stable across speci￿cations without endogeneity correction. In this
case, we ￿nd an average share around 20%, with no signi￿cant di⁄erence between
boys and girls. Model C is a simpler variant with no scale economies, which results
in slightly more precise estimates of the remaining coe¢ cients and in particular of
the sharing rule. In this model, point estimates of children￿ s shares are smaller,
namely 16:5% for boys and 17:5% for girls. In model D, where endogeneity of
total expenditure is controlled for, we ￿nd a signi￿cantly larger share for boys.
Interestingly with this variant, the wage ratio (ratio of female to male wages) plays
positively and signi￿cantly on the share of children. This is in line with previous
results that mothers are more altruistic toward their children than fathers (see for
instance Lundberg et al., 1997).
4.2 Interpretations and Comparisons
It is not surprising to ￿nd that the cost of children is larger in models A-B-D than in
model C. Indeed, the interpretation of children costs in these models incorporates
15To vary instruments in the ￿rst stage estimation of log expenditure, we have replaced house-
hold gross income by disposable income, and tried cubic speci￿cations rather than quadratic
ones.
16Browning et al. (2006) report a female share in excess of :60 while Lewbel and Pendakur
(2008) report a female share between :36 an :46 with a standard error of :08:
14the fact that parents are implicitly compensated by larger scale economies due
to the presence of children (part of the child￿ s consumption is joint). In other
words, the changes in the structure of consumption when the size of the family
increases can be attributed to economies of scale (and not only to the sharing
rule). For these models, our estimations of the cost of children are around 20% of
household total expenditure. For model C, the cost of children is smaller than for
the other models and often more similar to what is reported in previous studies
based on traditional Rothbarth methods17 (however not systematically, as seen
below). Even if, in our opinion, the estimations obtained with models A-B-D are
more realistic than what is generally reported, there are reasons to believe that
these estimations still understate the true values of the cost of children. Indeed,
the time devoted by parents to child care, which certainly represents a signi￿cant
fraction of non-market time, is not incorporated in our model. In particular, the
mothers￿part-time participation in the labor market that we observe in the data
may well be associated with the provision of child care. To account for child care,
future work should certainly incorporate labor supply decisions.
Before examining other estimations of child costs for Ireland, we can also compute
indi⁄erence scales, interpreted as the scale to household income that puts a single
individual on the same indi⁄erence curve as if living in couple. Indi⁄erence scales
are equal to the scale economy de￿ ator divided by the resource share. At the
sample mean and for model B, the indi⁄erence scale of a women in a childless
couple is :61=:55 = 1:11: This implies that such a women, if living alone, would
need 1=1:11 ’ 90% of the couple￿ s income to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as
when in couple. This is clearly larger than a half because the single woman would
not bene￿t from scale economies. In comparison, she would need 80% of total
expenditure, when alone, to be as well o⁄as when in a couple with a little girl. The
10-percentage point di⁄erence compared to the childless couple situation re￿ ects
the loss of welfare due to sharing, mitigated by the additional scale economies due
to the presence of the child. Hence, with model B, the e⁄ective cost of a girl is
only 10% (16%) of total expenditure from the viewpoint of the mother (father); the
e⁄ective cost of a boy is 12% (13%) for the mother (father). The interpretation of
model C is di⁄erent; the resource shares for adults measure directly their (money-
metric) utility. In this model, there is no scale economy and woman alone would
need only 45% of the couple￿ s income to reach the same indi⁄erence curve when in
a family with a girl. This ￿gure seems excessively small.
17See Deaton and Muellbauer (1986) and Gronau (1991) for instance.
15To continue we present some elements of comparison with previous ￿ndings for
Ireland. The cost of children in this country and the links to family policies have
been studied in several papers, including Conni⁄e and Keogh (1988), Carney et
al. (1994), Nolan (1999), Cantillon and Nolan (2001), Corrigan (2002), Cantillon
et al. (2004) and Garvey (2007). Closest to our present approach, Garvey (2007)
suggests an application of traditional Engel and Rothbarth methods to Irish house-
hold budget surveys (years 1994 and 1999). He documents a larger cost of children
in urban areas and a larger cost for boys compared to girls. We con￿rm the latter
result in our speci￿cation D only, but ￿nd in general relatively comparable results
for boys and girls.
Table 3: Cost of Children: Comparisons
Rothbarth  model model  C+
girl 25% 0.12 girl 25% 0.13 (0.03)
girl median 0.12 girl median 0.15 (0.04)
girl 75% 0.11 girl 75% 0.18 (0.04)
boy 25% 0.15 boy 25% 0.12 (0.03)
boy median 0.16 boy median 0.14 (0.03)
boy 75% 0.18 boy 75% 0.17 (0.04)
model  B+
girl 25% 0.14 (0.05)
girl median 0.16 (0.06)
girl 75% 0.18 (0.07)
boy 25% 0.13 (0.05)
boy median 0.15 (0.06)
boy 75% 0.17 (0.06)
Garvey (2007) present study
Note: all tables report the resource
share of children aged 0-4. Standard
errors in bracket. Model C+ is similar
to the Rothbarth's approach of Gronau
(1991) while model B+ incorporates
scale economies.
Garvey￿ s results are reported at di⁄erent point of the distribution of household
gross income. For comparability purposes, and to look at possible variations in the
cost of children along the distribution, we then suggest a variant of our Rothbarth
model C, denoted C+, where the sharing rule varies quadratically with household
gross income;18 this way, we partly relax assumption A.2, as discussed previously.
As shown in Table 3, we ￿nd slightly larger (smaller) costs for girls (boys) at
18Household gross income is the sum of labor and capital income received by adults before
taxes and bene￿ts. Note that results are very similar when it is replaced by household disposable
income. Also notice that we are not talking about equivalized income as we are looking at an
homogenous population (couples with a young child).
16the median compared to Garvey￿ s application of the Rothbarth approach; yet,
with standard errors around :04, we cannot reject that results are similar across
studies. The results of these two studies indeed provide a relative large con￿dence
interval that contains results from older/other sources. For instance, Conni⁄e et al.
(1999) estimate the cost of children using a combination of income and deprivation
measures across a number of basic items. They estimate a cost around 13 percent
of household income for a child aged under ￿ve years in a two-adult family. Using
the Household Budget Survey 1980 and an equivalence scale approach, Conni⁄e
and Keogh (1988) ￿nd a cost around 12 percent for this type of household.19
We also consider a variant of model B, denoted B+, where the sharing rule varies
quadratically with income. The cost of children increases in this case, especially in
the ￿rst half of the distribution. However, as explained above, the interpretation
is slightly di⁄erent since model B+ now accounts for larger actual resources due to
scale economies.
Finally, our results and Garvey￿ s results for boys point toward larger costs of chil-
dren (as a proportion of total resources) in richer households.20 We also ￿nd a
convex relationship between child cost and household income: child cost increases
more between the median and the 75th decile than between the 25th decile and
the median. Results thus seem to indicate that the dispersion of ￿ child resources￿is
larger than that of household income. If a poor child is de￿ned as receiving a share
below 60% of the median share, rather than as living in a household with income
below 60% of the median household income, then a larger spread in child resource
could signify that some poor children (according to the former de￿nition) live in
non-poor families (according to the latter de￿nition).21 At this stage, however, our
19Some other approaches are know to overestimate child costs, like the Engel approach. Using
this method, Garvey (2007) ￿nd a weight of :15 at the 25th centile, :18 at the median and :20
at the 75th centile for children under ￿ve. Note also that the McClements equivalence scale
used by policy makers in the UK attributes a weight of :18 to a four-year-old child in a two-
adult household. The modi￿ed OECD scale gives higher weights (:30) to children, de￿ned by
being under 14 year of age, but does not account for di⁄erent weights according to age (and in
particular for smaller weights for younger children).
20This contradicts the argument of Conni⁄e (1992), but the author ￿nds smaller child resource
share under the questionable assumption that public goods are luxury goods. Goods like housing
costs are usually seen as necessities so that the share of private consumption, and in particular
expenditures on children, may well be higher in higher income families. Note also that in our
estimation, the income e⁄ect is obtained for a constant level of expenditure.
21This result is consistent with alternative assessments of child poverty based on direct measures
of child deprivation; in particular, Cantillon et al. (2004) show that a signi￿cant minority of those
17exercise is more illustrative than of practical use for policies aimed at combating
child poverty. Indeed, we have focused on a group less at risk of child poverty
￿families with one young child and, most importantly, on two-earner couples ￿
while poverty concerns mostly children of lone parents, large families and families
with unemployed parents (Nolan, 1999). While accounting for families with sev-
eral children is in principle easy under certain additional assumption (Bargain and
Donni, 2009), future research should address parent￿ s labor supply decision within
the present framework.
5 Conclusion
This paper suggests a measure of the cost of children for Ireland based on the
approach proposed in Bargain and Donni (2009). Economies of scale are accounted
for in a simple way thanks to an Independence of Base assumption and can be
recovered using information on single individuals. The identi￿cation of the child￿ s
share of resources also requires the observation of expenditure on adult goods, as
in the traditional Rothbarth approach. We conduct the estimation on a pooled
sample of single individuals, childless couples and couples with one child, using
cross-sectional expenditure data for Ireland. Even though the estimates of scale
economies are very imprecise, we ￿nd relatively stable and more precise results for
the cost of children. Comparison with the standard Rothbarth method also convey
that economies of scale are an important element that should not be ignored when
modeling and estimating the redistributive process within households.
In the last section, we have sketched the possibilities o⁄ered by the present frame-
work to study child poverty in an innovative way, i.e., by considering the share of
resources accruing to children and evaluating child ￿nancial poverty on this ba-
sis. We have also stressed the fact that the present framework needs important
extensions and especially the explicit modeling of parents￿labor supply decisions.
Without this, it is not possible to account for households in which children are most
at risk of poverty nor to address the endogeneity of total expenditure to adults￿
labor supply choices. An alternative and simpler way could make use of demands
conditional on female participation to the labor market. However, modeling labor
supply decisions is necessary to measure the "complete" cost of children, including
the cost of the parents￿temporary retirement from the labor market for child care.
reporting some child deprivation are in households above the 60% income threshold, and so would
not be counted as poor even by the most generous relative income line.
18The theoretical model must also been re￿ned. For instance, it is not clear how
our model can account for changes in preferences and externalities in consumption
that are likely induced by children. Another interesting path for future research
is the comparison between the present microeconomic model and direct measures
of child deprivation as provided in recent surveys like Cantillon and Nolan (2001)
and Cantillon et al. (2004). Finally, new measures of the cost of children should
be discussed in the light of existing policies. For instance, Corrigan (2002) assesses
the relative generosity of Ireland￿ s child bene￿t package and its adequacy with re-
spect to child poverty rates and estimates of the cost of children. Garvey (2007)
compares the estimated cost of children to the weight put on children in di⁄erent
policy instruments (primarily family bene￿ts).
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